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For A Lawyers' Boycott of South Africa:
Ethics and Choice of Client
I. Introduction
Recently, students at many law schools boycotted job interviews
at law firms representing the South African government.' The law
student boycott raised questions beyond the scope of traditional dis-
cussions of "moral refusals" to represent clients:2 its collective
character created the possibility of an effect beyond merely protect-
ing the individual attorney's conscience. That broader effect was
the potential impact on the prospective client of a collective refusal
of representation. 3
A lawyers' boycott of South Africa is not only possible but ethi-
cally justifiable. The envisioned boycott would take the following
form: a group of public-interest attorneys issues a statement pledg-
ing that signatories will not represent the South African govern-
ment, and calling for all lawyers who oppose apartheid to sign.
These attorneys can influence by example a much larger legal com-
munity. The group has a few paid staff members, but relies for the
most part on volunteer associates from large, prestigious firms.
These volunteers urge other lawyers in their firms to sign on and to
make a firm-wide commitment to the pledge. Associates at a
number of firms are successful at winning such a pledge.
The aim of the boycotting lawyers would be to isolate and put
pressure on the South African government by drastically curtailing
the availability of counsel from the "elite" firms that South Africa is
accustomed to employing, thereby increasing the possibility of in-
ternal change in South Africa. Such a boycott is particularly likely to
have an impact as it comes during a period of great unrest and polit-
ical volatility in South Africa; an attorneys' boycott would therefore
be both timely and meaningful.
1. The boycott generated lively discussion, especially after the prominent Washing-
ton law firm of Covington & Burling dropped from its clientele government-owned
South African Airlines (SAA). Sanger, Law Firm Drops South Africa Client, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1985, at DI, col. 3; Cohen, Planning the Covington Boycott, American Lawyer, Nov.
1985, at 82, col. 1; Nelson, Covington's Decision May Spur Pressure on South Africa Issue,
Washington Legal Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
2. See generally THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYER'S ROLES AND LAWYER'S ETHics (D. Luban
ed. 1983).
3. The actual harm to a prospective client done by an isolated attorney's refusal to
represent is, compared to the harm possible from collective action, fairly theoretical.
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II. The Boycott and the Model Rules
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 4 do not speak directly
to the issue of collective refusal to represent a particular prospective
client. However, their guidelines concerning representation of mor-
ally distasteful clients and individual refusal or termination of such
representation suggest how the Rules might apply to a lawyers' boy-
cott. The Rules attempt to strike a compromise between two con-
flicting visions of the lawyer: one of counsel as legal technician who
bears no responsibility for implementing particular ends and can
with equal facility represent admirable or distasteful clients, the
other of counsel as moral being who need not compromise his or
her personal integrity by representing a repugnant client.
Rule 1.2(b) states the classic principle of professional detachment:
"A lawyer's representation of a client . . . does not constitute an
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities." 5 The Comment adds that "[l]egal representa-
tion should not be denied to people. . . whose cause is controver-
sial or the subject of popular disapproval." 6 However, Rule 1.16(b)
sets out the countervailing consideration: "a lawyer may withdraw
from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished with-
out material adverse effect on the interests of the client," 7 or if "a
client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent."8 Therefore if the attorney feels that rep-
resentation would endorse a repugnant course of action, he or she
may withdraw from or decline the case. 9
The same tension is reflected in Rule 6.2, regarding the accept-
ance of appointments. A counsel may decline "[if] the client or the
cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair. . . the
lawyer's ability to represent the client."' 0 The Comment to the
Rule contrasts this heightened standard for appointments with an
attorney's ordinary obligation to accept non-appointed prospective
clients: "[a] lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose
character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant."" Counsel
should, however, accept "a fair share of unpopular matters or indi-
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
5. Id. Rule 1.2(b).
6. Id. Rule 1.2 (Comment).
7. Id. Rule 1.16(b).
8. Id. Rule 1.16(b)3.
9. The language of Rule 1.16(b)3 is general; there is no stipulation that the "repug-
nant course of action" must be pursued specifically in litigation.
10. Id. Rule 6.2(c).
11. Id. Rule 6.2 (Comment).
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gent or unpopular clients."' 2 Thus a lawyer is not obliged to accept
any particular distasteful client, although he or she should generally
take at least some unpopular matters.
The disjunctive language of Rule 1.16(b)13 suggests that an attor-
ney may terminate representation due to the repugnance of the cli-
ent's objectives, even if there is "material adverse effect" on the
interests of the client. That proviso would appear to apply only
where there is no specific reason for withdrawing from a representa-
tion. If the material adverse effect proviso also applies in the repug-
nance situation, however, it might pose an ethical problem for
current counsel to South Africa who wish to withdraw during a boy-
cott. Under boycott conditions, South Africa would presumably
have a difficult time finding new representation upon the withdrawal
of former counsel. But aside from its possible relevance to with-
drawal during an ongoing adjudicative process, it is difficult to see
how this rule could prevent a lawyer from dropping South Africa as
a client. The "material adverse effect" language cannot have been
intended to bind a lawyer to lifelong servitude to a client in any legal
matter that might arise. If a client lost all his or her money, the
Rules would not compel counsel to continue representation on a
pro bono basis in future cases, even though finding other counsel
might be difficult.
The Rules, then, do not forbid individual refusal to represent
South Africa. In the words of one commentator, "a lawyer asked to
espouse a morally distasteful cause is neither damned if he does, nor
damned if he doesn't."' 14 Lawyers acting in concert ought to be
viewed similarly to lawyers acting individually, under the Rules. The
ethical burden on the attorney of a repugnant representation is the
same, whether the sense of repugnance is shared by many or only by
a few. Since the Rules do not censure individual refusal, they
should not be read to censure group refusal to represent, a matter
on which they are silent.
III. The Boycott and the Right to Counsel
The primary objection to the idea of a lawyers' boycott is that it
would infringe upon the boycott target's right to obtain counsel.
12. Id.
13. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
14. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L.
R~v. 689, 702 (1981). Professor Rhode's discussion of the lawyer's role as expressed in





Critics of the student boycott 15 made such an argument, grounded
not in the sixth amendment right to counsel,' 6 but in a broad ethical
claim of the rightness of a system which takes paying clients regard-
less of moral repugnance and the concomitant wrongness of collec-
tive or even individual rejection of clients on that basis. The right to
counsel ideal is simply that no one, no matter how distasteful,
should be prevented from hiring a lawyer. Attorneys, the argument
goes, should respect this principle and accept the ethical obligation
to represent clients regardless of their repugnance.1 7 From this
ideal, the argument concludes that an organized boycott would
completely thwart the right to counsel.
A former civil rights lawyer and leading critic of the student boy-
cott, Charles Morgan, Jr., followed this traditional perspective in
arguing that "lawyers should take cases whether their clients are
black or white, guilty or innocent, popular or unpopular or named
Botha or Mandela."' 8 Morgan compared the South African govern-
ment to Southern blacks in the 1950s and 1960s, in that both were
denied counsel, and condemned Covington & Burling for dropping
South African Airways (SAA) as a client. He argued that the deci-
sion was equally unjustified whether it resulted from business pres-
sure created by public disapproval of South Africa, or from the
moral revulsion of firm members.19
Morgan's criticism highlights the right-to-counsel objection that
would be raised to a lawyers' boycott of South Africa. Underlying
the right to counsel argument is the assumption that the existing
distribution of legal services through a free market is both justifiable
and fair. In a recent speech critical of the student boycott, former
Yale Law School Dean Eugene Rostow defended the fairness of the
existing system. He analogized this allocation of lawyers to a taxi-
cab system, which takes all paying fares on a first-come first-served
15. See, e.g., Morgan, Bad For Lawyers, Bad For Lawyering, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at
A35, col. 1. Since many of the arguments made by critics of the student boycott are
equally applicable to the lawyers' boycott, those arguments will be incorporated into the
case against lawyers' collective action.
16. The sixth amendment right to counsel has been held to apply only in criminal or
quasi-criminal cases. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963); Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The boycott would thus violate no constitu-
tional right of the prospective client.
17. This is also reflected to some extent in the Model Rules. See supra notes 5-6 and
accompanying text. But see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
18. Morgan, supra note 14, at A35, col. 1.
19. Morgan stated, "Whatever the reason, Covington and Burling . .. has . . .
turned a time-honored view of lawyering on its head." Id.
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basis. 20 By this argument, it is unjust to deny a generally disliked
but well-off client an attorney; ability to pay is a more equitable cri-
terion than moral or political acceptability.
Underlying this traditional right-to-counsel perspective is the idea
that it is dangerous for lawyers to inhibit aspiring litigants' access to
court on account of moral or political distaste, and even worse for
them to encourage other lawyers not to take clients of whom they
disapprove. It could be argued that if many attorneys publicly reject
clients whom they regard as repugnant, the general public will have
reason to assume that lawyers who still do represent unsavory clients
necessarily approve of those clients. This public identification of at-
torneys with their clients' positions and activities would then further
discourage those few courageous lawyers willing to represent un-
popular clients, 2 1 resulting in the destruction of the right-to-counsel
ideal.
However, this rather pristine vision of professional detachment,
also embodied in Model Rule 1.2(b), does not reflect the reality of
lay perception. The public already identifies lawyers with their cli-
ents. 22 It may be true that this identification makes it difficult for
any attorney to represent unpopular clients, 23 but a lawyers' boycott
of South Africa would not make the existing situation worse. More-
over, the boycott could actually improve the public image of the
legal profession by counterbalancing the negative popular image of
lawyers as "hired guns."
The right-to-counsel argument fails because it does not go far
enough: a boycotted South Africa would hardly be the only civil
client without a lawyer. For whole segments of the population, the
broad right-to-counsel ideal is merely that - an ideal, not an actual-
20. Address by Dean Eugene Rostow, Yale Law School Alumni Association Dinner
(Oct. 18, 1985).
21. Interview with Robert Cover, Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal His-
tory at Yale Law School, in New Haven, Connecticut (Nov. 15, 1985).
22. Professor Abel argues that "although the lawyer claims to be amoral in agreeing
to represent a client, and, thus, refuses to accept ethical responsibility, lawyer, client,
and society all persist in viewing the lawyer as implicated in the client's ends and ac-
countable for the means used to pursue them." Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 687 (1981). In support of his argument, Professor Abel
cites a case in Los Angeles where the claimant in a worker's compensation proceeding
shot the employer's attorney when compensation was not immediately forthcoming. Cf.
Los Angeles Times, Apr. 26, 1981, § 1, at 24, col. 1. Lawyers do identify with their
clients. For a discussion of psychological problems arising from the principle of detach-
ment, and lawyer's consciousness of responsibility for actions taken on behalf of clients,
see Postema, Moral Responsibility and Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980).
23. See, e.g., Goldberger, The Right to Counsel in Political Cases: The Bar's Failure, 43 LAw




ity. The need for attorneys far exceeds the available supply.2 4
Moreover, the distribution of the shortfall is not random, but falls
along income lines. Of course, there are legal services organiza-
tions, but they are able to handle only a fraction of possible cases.2 5
Thus, South Africa is no more singled out for deprivation than any
person who cannot afford a lawyer. Those invoking the right-to-
counsel argument can claim no moral superiority for the status quo
they seek to protect; even that status quo does not meet the right-to-
counsel ideal. Taxicab justice is simply not consistent with the
broad principle that people have the right to a lawyer.26
Boycott opponents attempting to salvage this principle might try
to make a distinction between the proper obligations of attorneys
and those of the government in providing legal services. Yet if the
government's obligation to provide legal representation only begins
just below the line dividing those clients who can afford counsel
from those who cannot, then surely the lawyer's representation of
only non-indigent clients cannot be characterized as a moral or ethical
obligation stemming from the right-to-counsel. Here, too, it is clear
that neither morality nor professional ethics lies at the root of the
arguments against the boycott.2 7
In addition, there is a substantial intertwining of the organized
legal profession with the government in the area of providing legal
services to the poor. Clearly, the Bar cannot disclaim all responsi-
bility for representation of indigents, since it has already voluntarily
recognized at least a shared responsibility with the government in
this arena.28
24. One study has estimated that only about 15 percent of the legal problems of the
poor receive legal attention. L. GOODMAN & M. WALTERS, THE LEGAL SERVICES PRO-
GRAM: RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND THE Low INCOME POPULATION 11-59 (1975).
25. For discussions of the inadequacy of the Bar's commitment to pro bono services,
see Rhode, supra note 14, at 696-701; Marks, A Lawyer's Duty to Take All Comers And Many
Who Do Not Come, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 915 (1976).
26. The right-to-counsel principle is not inherently unrealizable under conditions of
scarcity. Lawyers' services could be allocated in a more rational and fair fashion, by, for
example, using queueing systems, accepting only particular categories of cases, or ac-
cepting on the basis of how much a lawyer is "needed" for the particular case. The
necessity for lawyers could also be lessened by creating alternative forms of dispute res-
olution and relaxing the Bar's monopoly on representation by easing restrictions on
"unauthorized practice."
27. There is no moral reason for placing South Africa and other clients who happen
to have money in a higher-priority category for representation.
28. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983), "A lawyer should
render public interest legal service." In addition, leaders of the Bar have taken a role in
the development of legal services programs. See, e.g. Shriver, The Organized Bar and OEO
Legal Services, 57 A.B.A. J. 223 (Mar. 1971).
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IV. The Boycott and Usurpation of the Adjudicatory Function
A second argument against the use of moral criteria in choosing
clients is that such criteria usurp the function of judge and jury by
pre-judging the case. As Lloyd Cutler of Wilmer, Cutler & Picker-
ing asserted, "j]udgments of right and wrong are to be made after
the process is completed, not before it begins." 29
The thrust of the usurpation critique is that lawyers should not
deny litigants the opportunity to vindicate themselves in court. This
would apply to individual refusals to represent as well as to the boy-
cott, but with special force to the latter. In the case of the organized
boycott, the "usurpation" could amount to a "lawyer's trump"3 0
preventing South Africa from asserting a possibly valid legal
claim . 1
This argument is based on two flawed assumptions: first, that the
sort of judgment a lawyer makes in deciding to participate in the
boycott is adjudicative in nature; second, that in all cases the dispo-
sition of the individual case will amount to a final resolution of the
issue that motivated the boycott.
Examination of the usurpation problem reveals three possible in-
tersections between the repugnance of the prospective client and
the particular case at bar. In one area, the repugnance has nothing
to do with the legal claim. An example of a case in this area would
be one in which a person who is a Nazi seeks to contest a termina-
tion of welfare. In a second, the repugnance is in the legal claim,
and is capable of final judicial resolution. Such a case might arise
when a manufacturer of electric cattle prods goes to court to contest
a law forbidding sale where it appears likely that the prods would be
used against people. In a third area, the ultimate source of a client's
undesirability cannot be resolved in the case, but the representation
is nevertheless so intertwined with the source of repugnance that
lawyers feel their integrity would be compromised by the represen-
tation. Representation of South Africa falls in this category. Law-
yers' sense that apartheid is bad will not be conclusively adjudicated
in any case, yet the practice of apartheid manifests itself in some
aspect of nearly every case.3 2
29. Cutler, Book Review, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1746, 1750 (1974).
30. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, in THE GoOD LAWYER, 214, 231 (D.
Luban ed. 1983).
31. The boycott might appear to pose antitrust problems, but the non-economic mo-
tivation of the boycott organizers and the important first amendment interests involved
make this unlikely. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).




A boycott might well be inappropriate under the usurpation anal-
ysis in the first two areas, but not in the third. In the first, the rela-
tively slight degree of the attorney's involvement with the repugnant
aspect of the client would not justify the ethical "shunning" in every
unrelated legal matter. In the second, lawyers would in essence be
saying, "this case should lose, so we will bar it from court" -
prejudging that which a court should judge.3 3
The usurpation claim cannot apply to the third area, since the ar-
gument does not by its terms constrain all judgments by lawyers but
only those which the judicial system should properly make. The kind
of judgment attorneys participating in the boycott make is not adju-
dicative. It is, instead, analogous to a "political question" which is
not justiciable since it is properly decided in the executive and legis-
lative spheres rather than in the judicial sphere. Similarly, the judg-
ment that South Africa is repugnant is one which is in the province
of public and personal opinion. Thus, although it is South Africa's
policy of apartheid which gives rise to the distaste, that policy is not
directly on trial. A boycotting lawyer prejudges only that which the
legal system will not judge.3 4
In the case of South Africa, it is difficult to separate the source of
distaste from even the most apparently routine litigation. For exam-
ple, Covington & Burling represented SAA in securing landing
rights in a 1973 route certification hearing before the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board.35 This matter turned out to involve segregated cafete-
rias and toilets at SAA terminals, although the restrictions only
applied to South African blacks, notforeign blacks. Ultimately, Cov-
ington & Burling prevailed, and SAA was awarded landing rights
despite its recognized racial discrimination.3 6
Covington & Burling also represented SAA in 1970 when the New
York State Division of Human Rights charged that the government
of South Africa, and SAA as an instrumentality of that government,
example, whether racial discrimination in a particular case is permissible - but the
question of whether the policy of apartheid should stand or fall will, of course, never be
adjudicated in an American court.
33. Here, the distinction between the second and third areas is that in the former,
the source of repugnance is discrete and resolvable in any particular case. Thus, while
individual refusal to handle that case might be acceptable, an organized action against
the client would be inappropriate.
34. Law can pre-empt public opinion, for example by making certain kinds of dis-
crimination illegal. In the case of South Africa, however, national boundaries limit the
reach of our legal principles to the actions of other countries.
35. South African Airways, Permit Amendment, 63 C.A.B. 377 (1973). See also
GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT 202-203 (1978) (discussion of the case).
36. GREEN, supra note 35, at 203.
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discriminated on the basis of race in granting visas. Jurisdiction was
asserted on the basis of SAA's use of New York's Kennedy Airport.
Covington & Burling argued that New York State law did not apply
to a foreign air carrier, and won in the New York Supreme Court.3 7
To represent South Africa is to represent reprehensible policies
and practices. Such representation pre-empts the attorney's own
moral judgment without replacing it with an authority empowered
to make such a judgment; an arbiter could release the lawyer from a
moral dilemma by directly addressing ethical considerations. Be-
cause no such authority exists, a lawyers' boycott of South Africa
based on the repugnance of apartheid does not usurp the adjudica-
tive function.
V. The Boycott's Impact
Boycott opponents might be concerned that all lawyers would re-
fuse to represent South Africa, thus totally excluding it from the
legal arena. The unlikely eventuality that South Africa could find
itself totally unrepresented would pose ethical problems, though
not insurmountable ones;3 8 exclusion of South Africa should be no
more troubling than the ongoing exclusion of those who cannot af-
ford counsel. One could argue that it is morally worse to do inten-
tional harm than unintentional harm, but that distinction is not valid
here. The fact that attorneys set fees and choose paying clients nec-
essarily entails the intentional exclusion of those who cannot pay the
fees asked.
Some might argue that South Africa's legal problems are likely to
be more complex and major than those of indigent persons, thus
putting South Africa in a separate category more deserving of coun-
sel. Yet regardless of the complexity of South Africa's problems,
deservingness might more properly and ethically hinge on how im-
portant the legal problem is to the client. Moreover, South Africa is
a large and powerful nation with numerous alternative methods of
dispute resolution. Even deprived of counsel, South Africa could
turn to negotiation, arbitration, or even its power to freeze assets of
foreign entities or persons within that country.
It is in all likelihood impossible for the boycott to achieve total
exclusion. Yet it is not essential that the collective action achieve
such a result for it to be effective. A successful boycott would be
37. South African Airways v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S. 2d
651, 64 Misc. 2d. 707 (Sup. Ct. 1970).




one which made a powerful political and educational statement, iso-
lating South Africa and making it a pariah. One example of such
action in another arena is the recent artists' boycott of South Af-
rica.39 Furthermore, a boycott would be effective simply by ensur-
ing that South Africa could not procure the quality of representation
it might otherwise obtain, with the ease it might otherwise enjoy.
VI. Setting Ethical Limits to the Boycott Principle
A final argument against the boycott is that once the legitimacy of
such action is acknowledged, subsequent boycotts of clients deserv-
ing of representation become equally legitimate. This is a real dan-
ger, but not as uncontrollable a danger as boycott critics would
claim. We need not be prepared to accept any and all collective
refusals, for there are principled ways of evaluating them.
There are two important limiting principles. One is that a boycott
of any client who has historically been the subject of exclusion or
discrimination is unethical. The other is that boycotts - like our
system of laws - ought to focus on behavior, not immutable charac-
teristics. We should ask: does the boycott seek to exclude voices
which would be silent but for representation, or instead voices
which are heard with great force in our society with or without their
day in court? Does it exclude the defenseless and oppressed, or
those who would use the law to oppress others? An analysis of the
ethics of a boycott should look to the particular features of the re-
jected client.40
This scrutiny of particular features is neither unprecedented nor
unworkable. Content-consciousness is not foreign to the law; in
fact, the criteria above are analogous to the "discrete and insular
minority" standard in antidiscrimination law, which standard serves
to evaluate those who claim discrimination. A threshold issue in the
evaluation is the history of the group as a victim of unequal treat-
ment. As in antidiscrimination law, we may draw a line here be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable targets of a boycott action,
based on the particular features of the target.
By this standard, the South African government is simply not
comparable to poor blacks in the South in the 1950s and 1960s, as
Mr. Morgan claims. 4 1 There are a number of differences: historical
39. This was the movement affiliated with the "Sun City" recording.
40. See Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRUOUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81-117 (R.
Wolff, B. Moore, Jr., & H. Marcuse eds. 1965).
41. Morgan, supra note 15, at A35, col. 1.
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access to legal representation, wealth, political clout, and ability to
resort to alternative means of resolving disputes. These differences
illustrate the incongruity of characterizing South Africa as defense-
less and oppressed. To use the rhetoric of public calling to justify
representation of a powerful, repugnant client is merely to rational-
ize desire for private gain.
Boycotts should target what someone does, not what someone is.
There must be a nexus between the individual or entity who is the
target and the wrong which lawyers seek to protest. Thus, a boycott
of the government of Israel, or of the PLO, might be legitimate, but
not a boycott of all Jews or all Palestinians. The American Nazi
Party might be boycotted, but not all of its members in all legal mat-
ters. South Africa satisfies both principles. Its particular features
set it apart from persecuted minorities. The South African govern-
ment is directly responsible for the social, economic, and legal sub-
jugation of a majority of its citizens, and for the deaths of over
fifteen hundred of those citizens since September 1984.42 More-
over, South Africa is in a state of crisis; the situation there calls for
extraordinary pressure in order to bring about meaningful change.
It is particularly appropriate and important for lawyers to act as law-
yers here, since it is the unjust system of laws in South Africa which is
under attack. Attorneys ought to see themselves as moral actors in




42. Cowell, South Africa Reportedly Sent Appeal to Economic Parley, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1986, at A8, col. 2.
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